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I. INTRODUCTION
Skyrocketing health care costs have remained an issue of national concern for
most of this decade.2 Many Americans have come to believe that one of the primary
causes for the substantial increase in the cost of health care is fraud and abuse within
the health care industry.3 The United States government reports that federally
funded programs, such as Medicare,4 are fraught with fraud and abuse.5 The facts
1
University of Houston Law Center, Candidate for L.L.M. B.S.W., Southwest Texas State
University; M.S.W., University of Texas at Austin; J.D., St. Mary’s University School of Law.
With over ten years of experience as a mental health care provider, Ms. Mastin has worked
extensively with mentally ill and chemically dependent patients in a variety of health care
settings. The author would especially like to thank Assistant United States Attorney Bud
Paulissen, Criminal Division, Western District of Texas who challenged her to remember the
duty that every health care provider has to the patients they serve in the midst of a complex
health care delivery system. Additionally, the author would like to thank Professor Nora V.
Demleitner, St. Mary’s University School of Law, Mr. Ron Ederer, former U.S. Attorney,
Western District of Texas, Mr. Van Hilley of Goldstein, Goldstein and Hilley, San Antonio
Texas, and The Honorable Ewing Werlein, United States District Judge, Southern District of
Texas. The information and insight provided by these distinguished legal practitioners made
this Article possible.
2
See Jane Bowling, AG wins grant for health fraud unit, DAILY RECORD, Oct. 6, 1995, at 3
(reporting that the United States health care costs exceed $1 trillion).
3

See Charles J. Williams, Toward a Comprehensive Health Care Anti-Kickback Statute, 64
UMKC L. REV. 291 (1995) (stating that Americans believe that increased health care costs are
caused by fraud).
4
Medicare, a government sponsored health program for senior citizens, was established by
Congress on July 30, 1965. See Gloria J. Banks, Traditional Concepts and Nontraditional
Conceptions: Social Security Survivor’s Benefits For Posthumously Conceived Children, 32
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 251, 306 (1999). The Medicare program was part of the Social Security

53

54

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol. 15:53

presented by the federal government seem to support this public belief. The federal
government estimates that seven percent of all billings submitted by the country’s
Medicare providers are fraudulent.6 As a result, the government believes that the
Medicare program lost an estimated $12.6 billion in 1998 due to fraudulent and
improper billing.7
In 1995, public outcry for reform and cost-cutting measures in the federal budget
led the federal government to declare “war” on “health care fraud;” Janet Reno, the
Attorney General of the United States at the time, announced that the prosecution of
“health care fraud” would be the number one priority of the Department of Justice
[hereinafter “DOJ”] after the prosecution of violent crimes.8 Soon after the DOJ’s
declaration, in August of 1996, Congress passed the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 [hereinafter “HIPAA”], which significantly strengthened
enforcement efforts.9
Amendments to Title XVIII of the Social Security Act. See id. These Medicare Amendments
established a health insurance system for eligible elderly and disabled individuals under which
health care providers would be reimbursed directly for covered services and certain medical
supplies and equipment provided to beneficiaries. See Health Insurance for the Aged Act
(Medicare Act of 1965) Pub. L. No. 89-97, tit. 1, 79 Stat. 290 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). This Article will focus on “health care fraud” that occurs in
the Medicare program.
5

The General Accounting Office [hereinafter “GAO”] has estimated the costs of health
care fraud to be between $80 billion and $100 billion per year. See Sidney M. Wolfe, Grim
details under the headlines, 14 (2) HEALTH LETTER (Feb. 1, 1998).
6

See Rosie Mestel, Fighting Fraudulent Health Care Charges Medicare: The government
and the AARP have teamed to teach seniors how to spot bogus billing for services not
rendered or needed, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1999, at S3.
7
See Peter Eisler & Barbara Pearson, Fed triple health fraud cases: Crackdown hits
Medicare billing abuses, USA TODAY, Feb. 23, 1999, at 1A.
8

See Charles Pereyra-Suarez et al., Litigation Issues In Fraud And Abuse, 19 WHITTIER L.
REV. 51 (1997).
9
See Pub. L. No. 104-191, 5701 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.) (also referred to as the Kassebaum-Kennedy
Act). HIPAA required the Attorney General to establish a “Fraud and Abuse Control
Program” to promote the coordination and cooperation between state, federal, and local law
enforcement that investigate, evaluate, inspect and audit health care providers for fraudulent
practices, provide specific guidance to providers and share information. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320
a –7c (1998); Debra Cohn, Health Care Fraud Legislation, U.S. ATT’YS BULL., Apr. 1997, at
10.
Along with these guidelines, HIPAA provided additional civil, criminal and
administrative methods to combat health care fraud. See id. One of these tools was the
creation of an instrument to facilitate the decision-making process within the DOJ known as
an authorized investigative demand that functions like a subpoena. See Interview with United
States Attorney Lynn Bataglia, District of Maryland, U.S. ATT’YS BULL., Apr. 1997, at 7
[hereinafter Bataglia]. Unlike information secured in a grand jury subpoena, which is limited
in its distribution, the distribution of information gathered under an authorized investigative
demand allows the Assistant United States Attorney [hereinafter “AUSA”] working on the
criminal proceeding to share information with the AUSA working on the civil proceeding.
See id. In addition to such tools, HIPAA secured financial resources to investigate and
prosecute health fraud matters; initially, $47 million was appropriated in fiscal year 1997 for
FBI enforcement activities, which was to increase gradually to $114 million by 2003. See FBI
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The government has made a mark in its campaign against “health care fraud.” In
the last two years, the federal government has dramatically increased the number of
health care fraud investigations initiated.10
Thus, the number of criminal
prosecutions has more than tripled since the government declared “war” on “health
care fraud” with health care providers going to prison in record numbers.11
Additionally, federal prosecutors opened 4010 civil health care fraud matters in
1997,12 which represented the majority of the DOJ’s civil fraud workload for the first
time in history.13 By the end of 1998, the government reported that there were 3471
civil “health care fraud” matters pending.14 Finally, more than 2700 health care
providers were excluded from participation in the Medicare program in 1997,15
almost double the number of providers excluded in 1996.16 The number of
exclusions continued to rise in 1998 with the government reporting that it excluded
3021 health care providers.17 These governmental efforts netted a record $1.087
billion in judgments, settlements and fines in 199718 and the collection of $480

Fraud Cases Number 2800, For Seven Cases Per Agent, in FY 1999, HEALTH NEWS DAILY,
Feb. 12 1999, available at 1999 WL 10483289 [hereinafter FBI Fraud Cases]. Additionally,
HIPAA established a Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Account in the Medicare Trust
Fund, which provided $104 million in fiscal year 1997 for health care enforcement activities
as determined by the DOJ and HHS; the amount allocated to the DOJ was spent on personnel,
automated litigation support, and training. See Cohn, supra, at 11. See also Attorney General
Highlights, U.S. ATT’YS BULL., Apr. 1997, at 52 (reporting that funding was authorized for
166 new positions at the DOJ).
10

See THE DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AND THE DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HEALTH
CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM – ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 1997 (1998)
[hereinafter 1997 ANNUAL REPORT]; THE DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AND THE
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM – ANNUAL REPORT
FOR FY 1998 (1999) [hereinafter 1998 ANNUAL REPORT].
11
See 1997 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10. (stating that 363 defendants were convicted of
health care fraud related crimes); 1998 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10 (stating that 326
defendants were convicted of health care fraud related crimes.) See also Eisler & Pearson,
supra note 7, at 1A (explaining that 552 criminal cases of health care fraud up from 166 in
1993).
12

See 1997 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10.

13

See T. Jeffrey Fitzgerald, Health Care Providers Encounter the Civil False Claims Act
28 JAN COLO. LAW 65 (January 1999) (reporting that over sixty percent of the DOJ’s civil
fraud workload consists of health care fraud matters).
14

See 1998 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10.

15

See 1997 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10.

16

See id.; HIPAA’s Anti-Fraud Measures Led To Dramatic Spike In Medicare Exclusions,
6 (5) WASH. HEALTH WEEK, Feb. 2, 1998 (explaining that as a result of the enactment of
HIPAA there has been a dramatic spike in the number of Medicare program exclusions).
17

See 1998 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10.

18

See 1997 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10.
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million in 1998.19 The government states that it will maintain this return on its
actions as settlements and fines are collected in future years.20
Clearly, the government’s “war” on “health care fraud” continues to rage.21 But
what is “health care fraud?” How should it be defined? How “health care fraud” is
defined is especially significant to health law practitioners in light of a recent case in
which two Kansas lawyers were indicted in a Medicare kickback case.22 Although
the federal government asserts that billions of dollars are lost to “health care fraud,”
these numbers include situations that result from honest mistakes.23 The government
has admitted that in its reporting of “health care fraud,” it is unable to distinguish
situations where honest mistakes were made from acts of intentional fraud.24 In fact,
the False Claims Act [hereinafter “FCA”], the most commonly utilized civil statute
under which health care providers are sued for “health care fraud” includes health
care providers that have merely made mistakes.25
The FCA requires that the act be committed “knowingly.”26 However, proof of
intentional wrongdoing is not required to successfully bring a civil action under the
FCA.27 As a result, a health care provider can be found strictly liable for an act of
“health care fraud.”28 The government’s failure to distinguish between intentional
acts and mistakes in its war against “health care fraud” allows health care providers
who have made mistakes to be accused of committing “health care fraud” and

19

See 1998 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 2.

20

See id.

21

See Medicare has new plan to fight fraud: The government’s latest campaign enlists the
help of its beneficiaries to curb wrongdoing, STAR-TRIBUNE, Feb. 21, 1999, at 4A (reporting
that on February 24, 1999, the government will increase its troops in the “war” on “health care
fraud” by asking its Medicare beneficiaries to report billing errors for a $1000 reward).
22

See Jay Christiansen, Chairman’s Corner, THE HEALTH LAWYER, Nov. 1998, at 2. Here,
Mr. Christiansen, Chairman of the Health Law Section of the American Bar Association
expresses his concern about the case and its implications in regards to lawyers that practice
health law. See id.
23
See Nancy Dickey, Government to Grandpa: Rat out your Doctor, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24,
1999, at A18 (describing the way the government determines fraud and abuse in health care).
Nancy W. Dickey is the President of the American Medical Association [hereinafter “AMA”].
See id.
24

See id.

25

See Fitzgerald, supra note 13.

26

31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1996).

27

See United States v. Frizek, 111 F.3d 934, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (stating that the standard
is more comparable to gross negligence or “an extreme version of ordinary negligence”); 31
U.S.C. § 1329 (b)(3) (1996).
28

See Leon Aussprung, Fraud and Abuse: Federal Civil Health Care Litigation and
Settlement, 19 J. LEGAL MED. 1, 8 (1998) (stating that in United States v. Metzinger Assoc.,
No. 94-7520, 1996 WL 530002 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 17, 1996), defendants that did not cooperate
ended up with settlement agreements less favorable than defendants that did).
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sanctioned when in reality their conduct does not represent an act of fraud.29 A
definition of “health care fraud” that disregards the mens rea of the provider has a
devastating effect on the provider’s ability to deliver quality health care services to
the American people.30 This reckless way of defining “health care fraud” at best
brings an element of adversarial tension into the patient-health care provider
relationship that fosters distrust between patients and their health care providers.31
At worst, health care providers that have dedicated their lives to providing quality
health care services will lose their ability to pursue their livelihood, their reputations
amongst their peers and even their freedom.
Although the definition of “health care fraud” is only one of the numerous issues
of concern to health law practitioners and health care providers, the language that
defines the conduct in question is the foundation of all other concerns related to
“health care fraud.” This Article will demonstrate the need for a narrowly construed
definition of “health care fraud.” The Article begins by providing a scenario to
explain how a situation involving potential “health care fraud” can arise in the
delivery of health care services. The Article then addresses how “health care fraud”
is defined through a discussion of the process of the applicable proceedings and the
penalties that may result. The Article concludes by proposing a way to define
“health care fraud” that will result in a system of sanctions that is equitable and
proportional to the conduct committed by the health care provider.
II. THE ACT: MISTAKE OR FRAUD?
“Health care fraud” is predominantly discerned by the government in some form
of billing practice; this fraudulent billing practice usually involves the submission of
many small claims, some of which are legitimate services to the payor of the
delivered health care service or product.32 The following hypothetical demonstrates

29

See Dickey, supra note 23; interview with Mr. Van Hilley, Attorney, in San Antonio,
Texas (Mar. 30, 1999).
30

See Medicare has new plan to fight fraud: The government’s latest campaign enlists the
help of its beneficiaries to curb wrongdoing, supra note 21 (reporting that the leaders of the
AMA met with Medicare officials to complain about the governments use of inflammatory
language towards doctors because it will undermine the patient-doctor relationship); Mestel,
supra note 6 (reporting that physicians are concerned that the government’s education
campaign on health care fraud amounts to “[y]ou can turn your doctor in and get a piece of the
action . . . that’s basically what it amounts to”). Additionally, health care providers are
concerned because the Clinton administration will pay a $1000 reward to Medicare
beneficiaries for tips. See id.; Eisler, supra note 7 (reporting that health care providers are
concerned that “overzealous investigations target innocent breaches of complex billing rules).
31

See Dickey, supra note 23 (stating that government tactics place doctor and patients in
adversarial roles causing detention in their relationship); Mestel, supra note 6 (expressing
concern that government’s campaign will undermine the doctor-patient relationship).
32
The largest purchaser of health care services is the federal government. See Press
Release, Medicare, Health Care Financing Administration, Health Care Spending at Record
(Jan. 13, 1998), at <http:// www.hcfa.gov/medicare/medicare.htm. A federal government
health program pays almost fifty cents of every dollar currently spent on health care in the
United States. Id.
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how many health care providers may end up being investigated and prosecuted for
activities involving health care fraud.33
After completing nine months of employment, Dr. G terminated Nurse Black
without notice from her position as program manager at the Twilight Mental Health
Center [hereinafter “Center”], an outpatient psychiatric clinic for mentally ill senior
citizens located in a low-income urban neighborhood. The three-year old Center,
owned and operated by corporation H, is staffed by two psychiatrists, a family
physician, a program manager, a clinical social worker, a licensed vocational nurse,
two mental health technicians, and two clerical workers. The physicians are majority
shareholders of the corporation and are on the Board of Directors. The average
monthly patient census at the Center is about twenty-eight patients with ninety
percent of them being funded entirely by the Medicare program.
Angry about being laid-off, Nurse Black decided to file a lawsuit for wrongful
termination. During the initial consultation, she told her attorney that she believes
the Center is operating in violation of federal law. She stated that when she first
became aware of the Center’s inappropriate business practices she did not say
anything because she was afraid of losing her job. Two months before she was fired,
she decided to make the medical director aware of her concerns. At the meeting with
Dr. G, Nurse Black told the physician that she believed that some of the billing and
referral practices of the Center did not comply with federal law and certain Medicare
regulations. In addition, she told him some of the patients were inappropriately
referred to the Center because they did not demonstrate a mental condition that could
be successfully treated by the Center’s existing clinical services. Dr. G thanked her
for the information and told her that he would investigate her allegations. Nurse
Black did not speak to Dr. G further about this matter. Two months later, Dr. G told
her that she was being laid-off because her position was being eliminated due to
budgetary constraints.
Nurse Black explained to her attorney that the Center had been inappropriately
soliciting new patients for the Center by paying local family physicians a fee of $100
for every elderly patient referred to the Center for psychiatric care, regardless of the
mental status of the prospective patient. Additionally, Mrs. Black believed that
approximately one third of the claims submitted to Medicare were upcoded.34
Furthermore, she believed that rather than billing the services provided in the
program in one daily rate, the Center was billing for each service individually.35
33

The following facts are not based on any specific situation. Any similarity to a specific
situation is a complete coincidence.
34

Upcoding is a fraudulent practice whereby the patient’s situation is upgraded to a more
serious category indicating the delivery of a more complex medical service where the health
care provider presents a “billing for a more expensive service than that which is actually
provided to the patients” to the payor for payment. See United States v. Brown, 988 F.2d 658,
659 (6th Cir. 1993); Medicare Fraud or Honest Mistake, CHI. TRIB., July 19, 1998, at 12,
available at 1998 WL 2877439.
35

This fraudulent practice is referred to as “unbundling.” See Metzinger Assoc., 1996 WL
530002, at. Here, services that are usually billed as a group at a special rate under a single
procedure code are billed separately under individual procedure codes, allowing providers to
be paid more. See id. The American Hospital Association [hereinafter AHA] has challenged
the DOJ’s position that unbundling is fraudulent. See Fitzgerald, supra note 13. AHA states
that this position is legally unfounded and abusive towards health care providers. See id.
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Additionally, Nurse Black revealed that the other psychiatrist who usually had
about thirteen patients admitted to the outpatient program would come to the Center
at lunchtime and chat with all of them for about five minutes once a week. Often,
the doctor would simply ask the nurse on duty how the patients were and then write
psychotherapy notes in their individual charts.36 For these five-minute visits and nonexistent visits, Nurse Black believed that the psychiatrist billed Medicare for fiftyminute psychotherapy sessions.
After carefully considering the situation, her attorney agreed to take her case and
shortly thereafter filed a formal suit against the Center and the doctors for wrongful
termination. After this initial suit was filed, the attorney filed a qui tam37 complaint
in the appropriate United States District Court which remained under seal for sixty
days while the DOJ determined if the cause of action was viable and whether or not
DOJ would take over the prosecution of this case for Nurse Black. Four months
after discharging Nurse Black, Dr. G received a letter from the DOJ informing the
corporate owner that an investigation had been initiated to determine if the Center
has been engaged in acts of “health care fraud.”

36

This fraudulent billing practice is referred to as “retracting.” Retracting occurs when the
health care provider bills for services that were never provided. See United States v. Skodnek,
933 F. Supp. 1108, 1114 (D. Mass. 1996).
37
Although health care fraud is brought to the attention of the DOJ in numerous ways, the
government has become increasingly aware of fraud and abuse situations through the reports
of government informants. In 1992, there were seventeen “health care fraud” qui tam cases
filed, while in 1998 there were 283 cases filed. See FBI Fraud Cases, supra note 9. The FCA
establishes a private right of action for claims filed on behalf of the United States government
by private parties known as qui tam actions. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (1996). In qui tam actions,
private citizens are allowed to file a lawsuit in the name of the government charging false
claims. See § 3730 (b). Statutorily almost anyone but a member of the military can file such a
lawsuit. See § 3730. These individuals are usually fellow medical professionals. See
Bataglia, supra note 9, at 7. The statute even encourages persons that participated in the fraud
to come forward. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (D)(2) (1996). Regardless of their level of
culpability, the statute always requires the plaintiff, referred to as the relator, to be someone
with personal knowledge of the fraud or abuse. See id. See also Aussprung, supra note 28, at
9. The relator must have direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the
allegations are based. See 31 U.S.C.§ 3730(e)(4)(B) (1996). If there has been previous public
disclosure, the plaintiff or relator in a qui tam action must be the original source of the
reported information. See § 3730. The statute provides encouragement to the relator to report
fraud and abuse through financial rewards pursuant to the statute. See id. The reward will
amount to ten to thirty percent of the total recovery. See § 3730(c)(2)(d)(5)(d). The exact
amount depends upon such factors as the degree of the relator’s involvement in the fraud, the
relator’s contribution to the prosecution, and the extent of the government’s intervention. See
Adam Snyder, The False Claims Act Applied to Health Care Institutions: Gearing Up for
Corporate Compliance, 1 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 1, 9 (1996). Whistle blowers are
important in prosecuting health fraud cases because of the difficulty investigative agents have
in discerning the fraudulent conduct within extremely complex and sophisticated billing
schemes. See David R. Olmoes, Health Care’s New Breed of Whistle-Blower, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 17, 1998, at A1. The lawsuit is filed under seal for sixty days. See 31 U.S.C. §
3730(b)(4) (1996). During this time period, the DOJ determines if it will take over the
prosecution of the case. See § 3730.
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III. HEALTH CARE FRAUD PROSECUTION
A. Triple Proceedings
Government officials believe that “health care fraud” cases should be evaluated
with the full range of remedies available to deter future fraudulent activities.38 As a
result, “health care fraud” defendants face criminal, civil, and administrative
sanctions.39 When the federal government first declared war on “health care fraud,”
the government’s position was that all defrauders were going to be criminally
prosecuted, a stance similar to the government’s campaign against defendants
involved in the savings and loan banking crisis during the 1980’s.40 During that
period of time, the DOJ relied primarily on criminal prosecutions and put many
white-collar criminals in prison.41
In that process, the government spent millions of dollars prosecuting cases and
put numerous non-violent first-time offenders in prisons without recovering its
losses.42 Initially, the DOJ approached its campaign against health care fraud in the
same manner,43 however, the government soon realized that banks and savings and
loans are not like hospitals.44 “The government cannot close down all the hospitals
and put all the docs in jail.”45 In response to this realization the government relies
upon a process of triple proceedings in the resolution of “health care fraud” cases.46
Any situation where health care fraud is alleged can spawn simultaneous
administrative, criminal, and civil investigations and proceedings.47 Although these
separate proceedings are considered simultaneous, they have been started as much as
one year apart from each other.48
The Office of Inspector General of the Health and Human Services Department
[hereinafter “OIG”] and the Federal Bureau of Investigations [hereinafter “FBI”] are
the primary investigative agencies.49 Under HIPAA, the agents of OIG were given
authority to conduct criminal investigations involving health care fraud.50 Although
38

See Bataglia, supra note 9, at 9.

39

See id.

40

See Interview with Mr. Ron Ederer, former U.S. Attorney, Western District of Texas, in
San Antonio, Texas (Apr. 1, 1999) [hereinafter Ederer].
41

Id.

42

Id.

43

Id.

44

Id.

45

See Ederer, supra note 40.

46

See id.; Geoffrey A Goodman, Parallel Proceedings in Complex Health Care Fraud
Cases: The Blue Shield of California Cases, U.S. ATT’YS BULL., June 1997, at 8.
47

See Ederer, supra note 40.

48

See Hilley, supra note 29.

49

See Adelaide Few & Jay G. Trezevant, Fighting the Battle Against Health Care Fraud:
Federal Enforcement Actions, 72 FLA. B.J. 34 (1998).
50

See Ederer, supra note 40.
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the OIG agents are experts in ferreting out incidences of fraud and abuse in the
health care context, there are simply not enough of them to adequately discern
instances of fraud and abuse.51 This lack of manpower affects the interpretation of
the discovered information and ultimately the nature of the sanctions faced by health
care providers.52
The number of FBI agents investigating health care fraud increased under
HIPAA.53 Unfortunately, these FBI agents are not specifically trained to investigate
health care fraud activities.54 While they are quite capable of investigating
traditional criminal activities, they are not able to easily identify and recognize
evidence needed to prove fraudulent activity or distinguish fraudulent activity from
mistakes.55 The ability to glean a pattern of intentional or mistaken fraudulent billing
from a set of Medicare documents can be quite formidable for the untrained eye due
to the complexity of the Medicare billing process.56 Hence, whether the government
undertakes a civil or a criminal prosecution against a defrauder will depend heavily
on the quality of the evidence gathered in the investigation.57 However, by the time
the defendant is aware she is under investigation for health care fraud, the
government has probably determined that the case is sufficient to proceed.58 This
governmental advantage has convinced numerous defendants to negotiate a
settlement rather than finance a very expensive defense.59
Congress has given the DOJ and OIG the authority to prosecute “health care
fraud” in the Medicare Program through a number of statutes.60 The DOJ takes the
lead in determining how to proceed with prosecution of the “health care fraud”
defendant.61 Whether the DOJ’s decides to prosecute the “health care fraud”
defendant in a criminal proceeding, or sue them in a civil proceeding, or proceed in
both contexts, depends on how the government can best realize its goals in relation to
the specific facts of each case. The government hopes to recover its losses and
reduce incidences of fraud and abuse without undermining the delivery of health care

51

Id. Two agents cover central and south Texas. Id.

52

See id.

53

See FBI Fraud Cases, supra note 9 (explaining that HIPAA increased the number of FBI
agents).
54

See Ederer, supra note 40.

55

See id.

56

See id.; Hilley, supra note 29.

57

See Ederer, supra note 40.

58

See Aussprung, supra note 28 at 8; Pereyra-Suarez, supra note 8, at 64.

59

See Aussprung, supra note 28, at 8; Stuart M. Gerson, Will New Federal Guidelines
Arrest Overzealous Use of False Claims, 4 (1) ANDREWS HEALTH CARE FRAUD LITIG. REP. 10
(stating that providers firmly believe that they must “settle or perish”).
60
See Pamela Bucy, Crimes by Health Care Providers, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 589 (1996)
(providing an exhaustive discussion of the numerous statutes available to the government for
the prosecution of health care fraud in criminal proceedings).
61

See Few, supra note 49.

62
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services.62 Who the defendants are, their individual culpability, and the quality of
the evidence against them, are pivotal issues of fact in determining how the
government will proceed and the type of sanctions that could be imposed on the
defendant.
Generally, where “health care fraud” is alleged, the government will initially sue
any institutional defendant in a civil proceeding under the FCA because of the
potential for a substantial monetary award.63 Because the government is more likely
to recover the alleged monetary loss of the fraud from the institutional providers than
from the individual provider, institutional defendants are the primary targets in the
government’s campaign against health care “fraud.”64 Government officials believe
that sanctions involving monetary considerations of tremendous magnitude will deter
repeat fraudulent practices.65
In addition to recovering substantial judgments, it is easier and more
advantageous to the government to sue the “health care fraud” defendant in a civil
proceeding rather than prosecute them in a criminal proceeding. In a civil action, the
government’s burden of proof is the “preponderance of the evidence” standard,66 a
much lower standard than the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard required in the
criminal proceeding.67 The government does not have to prove that the health care
provider acted intentionally with knowledge of committing fraud.68 At the end of the
civil proceeding, the government has recovered its losses and has imposed
substantial penalties on the defendant without having to prove intentional fraud.69
The sanctions imposed as a result of the civil proceeding are devastating to the
majority of institutional defendants.70 With its financial goals realized, there is little
incentive for the government to spend its limited resources on a criminal
prosecution.71
62

See Bataglia, supra note 9, at 7.

63

See Ederer, supra note 40; Hilley, supra note 29. Bucy, supra note 60, at 589 (citing
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATT’YS MANUAL § 9-42.210 (1992)).
64

See Bataglia, supra note 9, at 4 (stating that many institutional providers are the subjects
of criminal and civil investigations because of the prevalence of fraud that is perpetrated,
primarily in the Medicare arena).
65

See id.; Eisler, supra note 7 (reporting Senator Aging’s response to claims that
aggressive investigations will harm innocent health care providers).
66

See generally Commercial Contractors Inc. v. United States, 154 F.3d 1357, 1362 (1st
Cir. 1998).
67

See generally United States v. Abdullah, 162 F.3d 897, 906 (6th Cir. 1998).

68

See infra Part III.B.(1).

69

See id.

70

See Aussprung, supra note 28, at 56.

71

See Bataglia, supra note 9, at 7 (stating “it may be more appropriate to bring a case
civilly because of its treble damages potential . . . . [c]ases are driven by monetary
considerations . . . that deters repeat [institutional] behavior”). In addition, no Medicare
claims processing contractor had been convicted of fraud despite numerous civil investigations
and huge settlements until the case against Blue Shield of California. See Aussprung, supra
note 28, at 8.
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If the fraudulent conduct is of such an egregious nature that the DOJ believes it
must be stopped, the individual defendants are most likely to be criminally
prosecuted.72 In order to proceed with the criminal proceeding, the DOJ must be
able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual defendants committed
this wrongful act intentionally. Proving the culpability of the defendants beyond a
reasonable doubt to a jury is the lynchpin in the DOJ’s decision to prosecute.73 This
means that the government must be able to prove that the wrongful conduct was
committed knowingly and willfully.74 The DOJ’s ability to prove that the individual
defendants acted knowingly and willfully is what makes the commitment of “health
care fraud” a crime.
The remainder of this Article will demonstrate how these governmental policies
and individual factors determine the government’s case and the defendant’s
punishment in the civil, criminal and administrative contexts.75
B. The Civil Proceeding
1. The False Claims Act
In a civil proceeding, the government is most likely to prosecute under the
FCA.76 The FCA was first enacted during the Civil War to aid the government in its
prosecution of gunpowder manufacturers who sold sawdust rather than gunpowder to
the government.77 Later, this statute was revived to prosecute defense contractors
who defrauded the government.78 The FCA creates liability for defendants who act
against the government by presenting or causing the presentation of a false, or
fraudulent claim for payment or approval; using a false statement or record to get a
false or fraudulent claim paid or approved; and conspire to defraud the government
to get a false or fraudulent claim allowed or paid.79 Health care providers can be
found strictly liable under the FCA.80 This lack of a requirement to prove a specific
intent to defraud makes it extremely difficult to defend false claims cases and rather
easy for the government to assert a claim of fraud successfully.81

72
See Bataglia, supra note 9, at 4 (stating that the government may want to prosecute
criminally if it believes the behavior of the individual defendant that could further harm the
community must be stopped).
73

See Ederer, supra note 40; Hilley, supra note 29.

74

See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1998).

75

See Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the CriminalCivil Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775, 803 (1997) (stating that any act inflicted on another
that inflicts pain can be considered punishment).
76

See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1996).

77

See Aussprung, supra note 28, at 5.

78

See id. at 6.

79

See 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1996).

80

See Aussprung, supra note 28, at 8.

81

See id.
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The activities that make out the act of “presenting or causing to be presented to
the United States a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval” are described
in the statute in general terms.82 Courts have interpreted the statute to allow a broad
array of actions to be considered the basis for a “submission of a false claim.”83 As a
direct result of this broad interpretation of the statute, the definition of “health care
fraud” has broadened to include quality of care issues,84 along with mistaken
statutory interpretations made by the provider.85 Much controversy has arisen from
the latter situation as to whether or not the provider has committed an inadvertent
error or whether the error actually represents a difference of opinion regarding
statutory interpretation between the government and the medical community.86
Health care providers have been prosecuted for “health care fraud” where real
differences of opinion regarding statutory interpretation were present.87
Today, it is possible to be sued in the civil context for malpractice and negligence
in regards to a quality of care issue or mistake and then face further liability under
the FCA for the submission of a fraudulent claim to a government insurer during the
time the poor quality of care situation existed or mistake occurred.88 The lack of
82

31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1996).

83

See Aussprung, supra note 28, at 32.

84

The U.S. Attorney’s Office in Philadelphia has obtained three settlements in cases where
the allegations were based entirely on the provision of poor quality-of-care and that the
resulting Medicare reimbursements were based on false claims only because quality-of-care
violations were present. See United States v. Chester Care Ctr., No. 98CV-139, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 4836 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 1998); United States v. City of Philadelphia, No. 98-4253
(E.D. Pa. 1998); United States v. GMS Management-Tucker, Inc., No. 96-1271 (E.D. Pa.
1996). Currently, there is only one reported case demonstrating judicial support of this theory.
See United States ex rel. Aranda v. Community Psychiatric Ctrs., 945 F. Supp. 1485 (W.D.
Okla. 1996). This theory is referred to as the “implied certification theory.” See Chester
Care, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4836. How this theory would be accepted by trial courts is
questionable considering that both the Fifth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals have ruled
that claims for services rendered in violation of statutes “do not necessarily constitute false or
fraudulent claims under the FCA.” See United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA
Health Care Corp., 125 F.3d 899, 902 (5th Cir. 1997). See also United States ex rel. Hopper v.
Anton, 91 F.3d 1261, 1266 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that “violations of laws, rules or
regulations alone do not create a cause of action under the FCA”). However, other AUSAs are
attempting to bring such actions forward across the country. See United States ex rel.
Mckenzie v. Crestwood Hosp., Inc., No. 2:97cv107 (E.D. Cal., Oct. 8, 1998).
85

See Fitzgerald, supra note 13; Ederer, supra note 40; Hilley, supra note 29.

86

See Dickey, supra note 23; Hilley, supra note 29.

87

But see Jonathan S. Shapiro, United States v. Ivan Namihas, M.D.: He Never Cried for
Us, U.S. ATT’YS BULL., June, 1997, at 5 (discussing case of physician who intentionally lied to
the government, committing fraud).
88

See David R. Hoffman, The Federal False Claims Act as a Remedy to Poor Care, U.S.
ATT’YS BULL., Apr., 1997, at 36 (stating that United States v. GMS Management-Tucker Inc.
represented the first time that the federal government brought an action under the FCA in
conjunction with the Nursing Home Reform Act to remedy a situation where health care
providers received reimbursement from government funds for the provision of inadequate
care). It should be further noted that as the delivery of health care services changes from a
fee-for-service system to a capitated system, courts may become increasingly receptive to this
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culpability on the part of the provider to commit an intentional act of fraud and the
expanded definition of “health care fraud” allow health care providers to be accused
of committing “health care fraud” when in reality their conduct does not represent an
act of intentional fraud.
2. Civil Penalties
The DOJ has come to regard the FCA as one of its best weapons in its campaign
against “health care fraud.” “Health care fraud” is most frequently prosecuted under
the FCA because it is relatively easy to prove the elements of the offense and
because the potentially devastating nature of the penalties encourages “health care
fraud” defendants to cooperate with the government to avoid them.89 The FCA has
two specific penalties.90 First, treble damages are available for all false claims
submitted.91 Second, a penalty of $5000 to $10,000 per false claim can be levied
against the defendant.92 Congress intended that the assessment of damages under the
FCA be “liberally measured to effectuate the remedial purposes of the Act.”93 While
the government bears the burden of proving damages, the method of proof does not
have to be scientifically exact.94 In addition to these specific penalties, a defendant
found liable under FCA may face exclusion from the Medicare program; generally,
exclusion from Medicare is a discretionary matter in a civil proceeding whereas in a
criminal proceeding exclusion is mandatory.95 However, where exclusion may be
for a period of years in a criminal matter, the government in the civil matter has the
discretion to impose permanent exclusion from Medicare and other government
funded health care programs.96
Fearing the government’s power to exclude, most providers will begin settlement
discussions early in the process to avoid heavier fines or criminal prosecution for
their lack of “cooperation” with the government.97 Although the government may
regain a portion of its loss, the harm sustained by the corporation as a result of the
severe penalties and high legal fees will usually inflict a fatal wound to the
corporation.98

type of case theory since the incentive to commit fraud will hinge more on the provision of
low-cost, poor quality services rather than billing for unnecessary services or services not
performed. See Aussprung, supra note 28, at 30.
89

See Aussprung, supra note 28, at 9; Hilley, supra note 29.

90

See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2) (1994).

91

See id.

92

See id.

93

See S. REP. 615 at 4.

94

See United States v. Killough, 848 F.2d 1523, 1531 (11th Cir. 1988).

95

See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a) (1999).

96

See § 1320a–7(b)(1).

97

See Aussprung, supra note 28, at 20-21 (stating that in Metzinger defendants that did not
cooperate ended up with settlement agreements less favorable than defendants that did.)
98

See Hilley, supra note 29.
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C. The Criminal Proceeding99
When “health care fraud” is found to have been committed “willfully” with
knowledge and intent to defraud, it is considered a crime under a number of federal
statutes. Although the federal criminal code includes statutes that address criminal
“health care fraud,”100 federal prosecutors mostly utilize traditional generic fraud
statutes to prosecute “health care fraud” because many of the situations currently
subject to an indictment occurred before the enactment of these statutes.101 The most
widely utilized criminal statute is mail fraud,102 followed by submission of false
statements,103 and criminal false claims act.104 A person commits mail fraud when
she schemes to defraud a victim, or obtain money or property by false or fraudulent
pretenses and uses the postal service, or any private or commercial interstate carrier
to accomplish this goal.105
Federal officials have increasingly turned to criminal prosecutorial methods
traditionally used to combat organized crime in their campaign to investigate and
prosecute health care fraud.106 Federal investigators of health fraud have increased
the number of seizures and “freezing” of assets of those suspected of defrauding the
government.107 They increasingly indict health care fraud defendants for offenses
such as money laundering,108 crimes under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act [hereinafter “RICO”]109 and conspiracy.110 “Health care fraud”
was added as an underlying offense to money laundering with the enactment of
99

See Interview with Assistant United States Attorney Bud Paulissen, Criminal Division,
Western District of Texas, in San Antonio, Texas (Mar. 12, 1999) (discussing general issues
regarding prosecution of “health care fraud” from time of indictment through sentencing).
100

See 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (1998).

101

See Bucy, supra note 60.

102

See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1999).

103

See § 1001.

104

See Bataglia, supra note 9, at 4.

105

See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1999).

106

See Michael E. Runyan & David Reese Jennings, Practicing in the Field of Injunctions,
U.S. ATT’YS BULL., Apr. 1997, at 23.
107
See 18 U.S.C. § 1345 (1999). This is the Health Care/Bank Fraud/Wire and Mail Fraud
injunction statute recently amended. Id. Basically, this statute provides a civil remedy for
criminal conduct. See id. It is utilized when an AUSA asks for an injunction to “freeze” the
bank accounts of those in violation of health care provisions added to § 1345. See Runyan,
supra note 106, at 23; Thomas Wilder, Unconventional Laws Used In Fight Against Fraud By
Federal Officials, NAAG HEALTH CARE FRAUD REPORT, July/Aug. 1996.
108
See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(F) (1999). This statute was recently amended by HIPAA
adding health care fraud as an underlying act for the purpose of establishing a crime under the
money laundering statute. See id.
109

See Daniel N. Burton & Michael S Popok, Managed Care, 75 FLA. B.J., 32 (1998)
(describing how federal RICO and other forfeiture statutes have been expanded to include
health care fraud as a predicate offense).
110

See 18 U.S.C. §§ 286, 371 (1999).
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HIPAA.111 As a result, health care providers that commit “health care fraud” and
then conduct financial transactions with the money obtained through the fraud may
be laundering money.112 RICO has been utilized to prosecute physicians who
conspire with attorneys and patients to submit false claims to insurers and physicians
who make false claims for services not rendered.113
In the criminal context, the government must prove each element of the offenses
beyond a reasonable doubt. The central issue is whether or not the conduct was
criminal.114 Here, the struggle between the defense and the prosecution is whether or
not the health care provider intended to defraud or only committed an inadvertent
error, due to the complexity of the Medicare billing system.115 Determining intent is
difficult due to the extremely complicated billing process required by the
government.116 One reason the billing process is considered problematic is because
federal officials and providers disagree on the meaning of the language utilized in
billing forms; this difference in interpretation has been enough to convict providers
for committing fraud.117
Hiding behind the mire of regulations, health care providers complain that the
government is unfairly prosecuting them for mistakes; however, it is important to
note that the government must meet a very high burden of proof to charge a health
care provider with a crime. It is highly unlikely that a federal prosecutor would
indict a defendant for “health care fraud” without being able to prove her case in
light of the high esteem that most health care providers are held within the
community, and the political and professional consequences of losing such a case.
But equally disturbing is the fact that the DOJ in many cases charges under the FCA
to take advantage of the doctrines of estoppel by judgment and res judicata.118 As a
result, if the federal prosecutor declines to proceed with criminal prosecution under
FCA,119 health care providers can still be found liable for fraudulent schemes where
the government cannot prove a criminal wrongdoing.120 When the government’s
prosecutor cannot prove her case beyond a reasonable doubt, the government’s
interest of retribution for alleged wrongdoing will be vindicated through a civil
action under the FCA. Unfortunately, this prosecutorial “safety-net” allows innocent
health care providers to be harmed.

111

See § 1956(a)(1).

112

See Bucy, supra note 60, at 611.

113

See id.

114

See Thomas A. Withers et al., The Tao of the Health Care Fraud Trial, U.S. ATT’YS
BULL., Apr. 1997, at 19.
115

See Dickey, supra note 23; Hilley, supra note 29.

116

See Dickey, supra note 23; Hilley, supra note 29.

117

See Hilley, supra note 29.

118

See Kristine DeBry et al., Health Care Fraud, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 815, 838 (1995).

119

See 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1994).

120

See DeBry, supra note 118, at 838.
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1. Criminal Penalties
The punishment of individuals convicted of crimes related to “health care fraud”
has been accomplished by a system of determinate sentencing since the enactment of
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 [hereinafter “ACT”].121 The ACT created the
United States Sentencing Commission (within the judicial branch of the federal
government), which was entrusted with developing determinate sentencing
guidelines.122 These guidelines were created to provide uniformity in sentencing
practices amongst the federal judiciary.123 Congress envisioned that the guidelines
remove or at least lessen sentencing disparities among defendants found guilty of
similar offenses with similar criminal histories.124 After a health care provider has
been found guilty of “health care fraud,” the sentencing court determines what
punishment the individual will receive within the statutory limitations.125 In addition
to being incarcerated for a period of time, the “health care fraud” defendant may also
be required to pay fines and restitution and forfeit any assets acquired with the
proceeds from the fraudulent conduct.126 The majority of the federal statutes that can
be applied to “heath care fraud” call for terms of imprisonment not to exceed five
years per violation,127 and fines not to exceed $250,000.128
The trial court determines the specific punishment of each “health care fraud”
offender through application of the federal sentencing guidelines.129 The court
begins this process by determining the “offense level.” To determine the offense
level, the sentencing guidelines assign a sentencing range to the crime or crimes
which the defendant was convicted (the base offense level), and then provide for a
number of upward or downward adjustments depending on the specific
characteristics of the offense.130 If the defendant has been convicted of more than
one crime, crimes which involve similar harm are grouped together and a combined
score is assigned reflecting the seriousness of the harm. If the offenses are unrelated
in nature, the resulting offense level will be keyed to the most serious offense.131 It is
likely in a “health care fraud” situation that the prosecutor will seek to charge the

121

See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3742 (1994); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1994).

122

See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3742; 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998.

123

See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3742; 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998.

124

See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (1994).

125

See 18 U.S.C. §§ 286, 287, 371, 1001, 1341, 1343; 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (1994)
(providing five or ten year maximum terms of imprisonment).
126

See 18 U.S.C. §§ 286, 287, 371, 1001, 1341, 1343 (1998); 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b
(1994).
127

See 18 U.S.C. §§ 286, 287, 371, 1001, 1341, 1343; 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (1994).

128

See 18 U.S.C. § 3571(c) (1994).

129

§§ 3551-3742; 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1994).

130

See Bucy, supra note 60, at 634.

131

See generally, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3742 (1994); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1994).
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most serious offenses possible.132 Federal prosecutors feel compelled to do this due
to the insignificant punishment provided for crimes of fraud.133
Fraud is assigned a base offense level of six.134 Numerous upward and
downward adjustments reflecting the unique nature of the particular “health care
fraud” offense are applied to the base offense level.135 In the sentencing phase, the
court may consider all conduct discovered from the investigation that is proved by a
preponderance of the evidence, including uncharged conduct.136 The uncharged
conduct utilized to determine sentencing includes conduct gleaned from evidence
that was obtained in violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights,137 and
acquitted conduct.138 When the defendant has successfully negotiated with the DOJ
to only be charged with one felony, and acquitted of other charges, the conduct
reflecting the acquitted conduct will still be utilized to determine the offense level.139
The first adjustment applied to the base offense level is an adjustment for the
amount of the “loss” caused by the crime, when drafting the guidelines for economic
crimes, the original Sentencing Commission made “loss” the lynchpin of the
sentencing process for crimes of fraud.140 Therefore, a certain number of points for
any pecuniary loss over $2000 will be added to the base offense level of six.141
“Loss” is determined by identifying two factors: 1) the total economic harm that
resulted due to the defendant’s conduct, and 2) and the relevant harm - the portion of
the total harm experienced by the victims.142 Regardless of the nature of the actual

132
See Cedric L. Joubert, Determining “Loss” in Medicare Fraud Prosecutions, U.S.
ATT’YS BULL., Apr. 1997, at 40.
133

See id. Crimes of fraud alone only call for an unadjusted sentencing range of zero to six
months while the unadjusted sentencing range for a crime such as money-laundering, a crime
often charged in conjunction with crimes of health care fraud, is forty-six to fifty-seven
months. See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL.
134

See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2F1.1 (a) (1998).

135

In determining the relevant conduct to be considered, the court will rely upon and adopt
the Pre-sentence Report prepared by the U.S. Probation Department. See United States v.
Sidhu, 130 F.3d 644, 654 (5th Cir. 1997). The defendant has the burden of producing any
specific rebuttal evidence. See id. Without rebuttal evidence, it is proper for the court to
adopt the report. See id.
136
See United States v. Galloway, 976 F.2d 414, 419 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507
U.S. 974 (1993) (upholding a sentence that relied upon uncharged conduct).
137

See United States v. McCroy, 930 F.2d 63, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1991) cert. denied, 502 U.S.
1032 (1992).
138

See United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 387 (2d Cir. 1992).

139

See Sidhu, 130 F.3d at 654.

140

See Frank O. Bowman, Guest Editor’s Observations, 10 FED. SENT. R. 3 (Nov./Dec.

1997).
141
The amount of the loss determines the number of points that will be added to the base
offense level. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2F1.1 (b) (1998).
142

See Bowman, supra note 140.
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loss, numerous circuits have determined that if the actual loss is less than the
intended loss, the intended loss may be considered for purposes of sentencing.143
However, certain limitations have been instituted in determining “loss.” For
example, the loss used to calculate the sentence must stem from the defendant’s
criminal activity as opposed to civil violations.144 Maintaining this distinction where
parallel “health care fraud” proceedings are involved is critical in the sentencing
phase of the “health care fraud” defendant. It is essential to insure that the “loss”
utilized in determining the punishment of “heath care fraud” defendants arises from
the charged conduct. Additionally, a “loss” figure may be utilized for sentencing
purposes only if the record supports by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant intended a particular amount of loss or that a loss in that amount was
probable.145 A factor of specific concern in determining loss in “health care fraud” is
whether or not the provision of legitimate services to a beneficiary will be considered
a mitigating factor in measuring loss.146 In “health care fraud” situations, several
circuits have ordered the government to determine the value of the necessary
services that were provided and reduce the proposed loss by this amount.147 This
approach to calculating loss has been sharply criticized because it tends to view the
loss from the perspective of the defendant rather than the victim.148 Federal
prosecutors believe that this approach to determining loss does not adequately
represent the risk to the victim and that it would be more equitable to give health
care fraud defendants credit where benefits were received and the billing to the
insurer was appropriate.149 However, this strategy is not meaningful in determining
punishment because the billing has already been deemed to be fraudulent by the factfinder.
After the determination of loss has been made, the sentencing court will next
consider all relevant actions committed by the defendant in furtherance of the
criminal conduct.150 In “health care fraud” crimes, there are certain adjustments that
143

See United States v. Abud-Sanchez, 973 F.2d 835, 838 (10th Cir. 1992); United States
v. Calhoun, 97 F.3d 518, 523 (11th Cir. 1996).
144

See Abud-Sanchez, 973 F.2d at 839, 843.

145

See id. at 838. Statistical models that determine loss must have a sufficient factual
basis. See United States v. Galuzzo, 53 F.3d 334, 336 (7th Cir. 1995).
146

See Sidhu, 130 F.3d at 654; Carol C. Lam, Assessing Loss in Health Care Fraud Cases,
10 FED. SENT. R. 146 (Nov./Dec. 1997).
147

See United States v. Rutgard, 116 F.3d 1270, 1271 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Jackson, 95 F.3d 500, 508 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Licciardi, 30 F.3d 1127, 1134 (9th
Cir. 1996). Similarly, several circuits have found that where a defendant has obtained a
fraudulent bank loan, only the amount of the loan that the defendant intends not to repay may
be considered the “intended loss.” See e.g., United States v. Johnson, 16 F.3d 166 (7th Cir.
1994); United States v. Shaw, 3 F.3d 311 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Menichino, 989
F.2d 438 (11th Cir. 1992); United States v. Kopp, 951 F.2d 521, 523 (3d Cir. 1991); United
States v. Smith, 951 F.2d 1164 (10th Cir. 1991). For the value of services to be considered in
determining loss, the defendant must provide rebuttal evidence. See Sidhu, 130 F.3d at 654.
148

See Lam, supra note 146.

149

See id.

150

See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3 (1998).
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are usually considered. First, a determination is made as to whether or not the
fraudulent scheme involved more than minimal planning.151 Minimal planning is
present in any case where acts are repeated over a period of time or more complex
planning than would normally be done before the commission of the offence.152
Other upward adjustments to the base offense level include factors such as whether
the defendant abused a position of public trust or special skill,153 whether or not the
defendant was “an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or
more participant or was otherwise extensive,”154 whether or not the offences
impacted vulnerable victims,155 and whether or not the provider obstructed justice.156
One adjustment that may be applied to the offense level is a downward adjustment
for acceptance of responsibility.157 The earlier in the investigation that the “health
care fraud” defendant decides to cooperate and enter a plea with the government the
more likely the defendant will receive a two or three point reduction for his
cooperation.158 Although the sentencing guidelines state that going to trial will not
effect the offender’s ability to receive this adjustment, in practice, defendants that go
to trial don’t receive this adjustment to their offense level.
Once the trial court has determined the offense level as proscribed by the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual it will next consider within which criminal history
category the defendant falls; a separate score is calculated based on the defendant’s
criminal history to determine the criminal history category.159 Most “health care
fraud” defendants will be first-time offenders; therefore their assigned criminal
history category will be category one. The scores for the offense level and the
criminal history category are then applied to a sentencing table containing a grid on
which both scores appear at various levels.160 The point where these two scores
intersect indicates the defendant’s guideline range expressed in months of
imprisonment.161
The court may choose to depart upward or downward from the sentencing
guideline range if the case demonstrates certain “unusual features.”162 Features that
may be considered for downward departures include whether the defendant provided

151

See § 2f1.1(b)(2).

152

See § 1B1.1, n.1 (f).

153

See § 3B1.3; United States v. Burgos, 137 F.3d 841, 844 (5th Cir. 1998).

154

See Sidhu, 130 F.3d at 654; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.1 (1998).

155

See Sidhu, 130 F.3d at 654; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.3 (1998).

156

See Sidhu, 130 F.3d at 651; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1 (1998).

157

See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (1998).

158

See id.

159

See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 4A1.1 – 4B1.4.

160

See § 5 Pt. A.

161

See id.

162

18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (1996); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1. – 5K2
(1998).
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“substantial assistance to authorities,”163 whether the defendant was coerced,164 and
whether the mental capacity of the defendant was diminished.165 The sentencing
court would consider upward departures in situations where the defendant’s conduct
resulted in harm to his victim, including extreme psychological injury, physical
injury or death.166 It is important to note that if the “health care fraud” defendant
loses her license to practice in her specific field as part of the plea agreement, this
will most likely not be a basis for a downward departure.167
Despite the apparent complexity of utilizing the sentencing guidelines to
determine the appropriate sentence for intentional defrauders, these defendants face
insignificant amounts of prison time. For example, a first time defrauder has to
defraud more than $40,000 before any sentence of imprisonment is mandated.168 A
defendant whose actions caused a substantial loss of money also receives a strikingly
insignificant sentence. For example, if a defrauder pleads guilty to defrauding the
government of twenty to forty million dollars he would only be sentenced to a term
of imprisonment between thirty-seven and forty-six months in duration.169
The adoption of Organizational Sentencing Guidelines170 by the United States
Sentencing Commission may play a significant role in ensuring corporate
compliance;171 however, in the health care context, their significance has yet to be
realized. Under these sentencing guidelines, institutional defendants cannot be
imprisoned, only fined.172 A substantial number of institutional health care providers
are depleted of their assets in the civil prosecution.173 Therefore, the possible
163
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168

The $40,000 figure assumes a “more than minimal planning” adjustment under U.S.
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sanctions under the civil FCA alone have provided powerful incentives for
corporations to have in place compliance programs to detect violation of law, to
promptly report these violations to officials when discovered and to take prompt,
voluntary remedial measures.174
D. Administrative Proceedings & Penalties
Compliance with governmental regulations and involvement with the
administrative agencies that enforce these regulations is an inherent component of
almost all aspects of the health care delivery system.175 The health care provider and
the administrative agencies are involved in a continuous relationship where the
agency promulgates regulations that the health care provider strives to meet in order
to assure reimbursement from the government.176 When an accusation of fraud is
made, an additional administrative process is activated.177
Along with being exposed to criminal and civil sanctions, the “health care fraud”
defendant faces numerous administrative sanctions. One of the most feared
sanctions is exclusion as a provider from the federal health care program.178 A
decision to exclude is discretionary in a civil proceeding but in a criminal proceeding
a finding of fraud results in automatic exclusion.179
In addition to exclusion from Medicare, the provider faces the possible loss of
her professional license.180 Although loss of licensure is not automatic, the DOJ is
vigilant in informing governing boards of professionals of the fraudulent conduct
committed by its members.181 In particularly egregious situations, the DOJ will
require that the individual health care provider voluntarily surrender his license to
practice as part of the negotiated plea agreement to avoid more severe
consequences.182 The imposition of either of these two sanctions will mean
economic and professional ruin for the provider.
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But see Geri Aston, Fed Unveil New Fraud Disclosure Policy, AM. MED. NEWS, Nov. 9,
1998 (pagination unavailable) (reporting that the new voluntary compliance program although
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affirmatively state that self-disclosure does not obligate the OIG “to resolve the matter in any
particular way.” See id.
175
See
Website
of
Health
Care
Financing
Administration,
at
<http://www.hcfa.gov/medicare/medicare.htm> (the Health Care Financing Administration
[hereinafter “HCFA”] is responsible for the administration of the Medicare program).
176
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V. PROPOSAL
Fraud is defined as the “intentional perversion of truth for the purpose of
inducing another in reliance upon it to part with some valuable thing belonging to
him. . . .”183
In the legal realm only the criminally convicted can be punished.184
Nevertheless, this is not the case in the prosecution of “heath care fraud.” Health
care providers are either being punished too severely (in civil proceedings) or not
severely enough (in criminal proceedings). In part, this inequity results because
“health care fraud” is broadly defined to include a variety of acts that have nothing to
do with the “intentional perversion of the truth.” The words “health care fraud” have
come to include a range of conduct, which includes mistakes, malpractice, and the
provision of inadequate care and acts of intentional fraud.
This definition of “health care fraud” results in the inequitable prosecution and
disproportionate punishment of health care providers. Health care providers that
have made a mistake or have not made mistakes185 are being accused and punished
of committing fraud just like those that have intentionally committed fraud.
Congress, the DOJ, and health care providers recognize the need to limit the
scope of what activity is identified as “health care fraud.” In response to the
devastating financial effects of the FCA, and concerns of the overzealous application
of the statute, health care providers joined forces lobbying Congress to pass the
Health Care Claims Guidance Act [hereinafter “HCCGA”].186 HCCGA provided
several safe harbors with retroactive effectiveness.187 However, the HCCGA was
allowed to die in committee.188 Instead, the Deputy Attorney General [hereinafter
“DAG”] issued a memorandum to give guidance on the use of the FCA in the civil
context to reduce the growing fear of health care providers that through the
“unbridled prosecution” of “health care fraud” their livelihoods would be
destroyed.189 The DAG further noted that the purpose of his memorandum was “to
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emphasize the importance of pursuing civil False Claims Act cases against health
care providers in a fair and even-handed manner. . . .”190
The intent of the “health care fraud” defendant should be the lynchpin in
determining how the government resolves the case. Prosecution of the health care
fraud defendant should be limited by his intent to commit intentional fraud willfully
and with knowledge. If the health care fraud was committed intentionally then both
the individual and institutional defendants should be criminally prosecuted. Only
acts of intentional fraud that can be proven beyond a reasonable doubt should be
referred to as “health care fraud.” Actual fraud should be the standard for labeling
an action fraudulent rather than the almost strict liability standard currently being
used regardless of intent in civil proceedings. Under this model of defining health
care fraud, the words “health care fraud” would only be utilized in the context of the
criminal proceeding. Thus, narrowing the scope of what is labeled “health care
fraud” would allow the punishment of health care providers to correctly indicate the
providers’ culpability, communicating a more accurate message to the community
regarding the providers’ behavior in relation to billing practices and other areas of
concern such as the provision of inadequate care or negligence. Utilizing this
framework, conduct that is less than intentional would be prosecuted within the civil
context and referred to as “health care abuse.” “Health care abuse” is defined as
provider practices that fall short and are inconsistent with sound practices and result
in unnecessary costs or remuneration for services that do not meet professionally
recognized standards for health care.191 Health care providers that commit “health
care abuse” could be held strictly liable as most are under the FCA.
This model of reform would allow the government to fully realize its goals. The
government can recover its losses and reduce fraud without disrupting the delivery of
health care services. At the same time, it can send a strong message to health care
fraud providers that fraudulent and reckless billing practices and other acts of fraud
will not be tolerated. Although, the health care fraud defendant found guilty within
the criminal context would not be sued in the civil context for the same behavior, the
government could recover its losses through restitution. The sentencing court can
order the individual and the corporate defendant to pay restitution.192 Restitution is
not considered a part of the punishment but rather a remedial action to extinguish
any harm suffered by the victim as a result of the offense.193 States with limited
resources have already chosen to ask for restitution in the criminal proceeding rather
than instituting a separate civil case.194 This paradigm allows the federal government
to meet its goals while protecting health care providers.
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VI. CONCLUSION
By combating “health care fraud,” the government hopes to recover the proceeds
of fraud, punish true defrauders and deter continued fraudulent behavior while
strengthening the health care delivery system. Defining “health care fraud” narrowly
would subject defendants to sanctions that are just, fair, and proportional to the
committed conduct. As a result, the government’s goals will be more fully realized
when health care providers, no longer fearful of the consequences of being accused
of fraud, can work closer and communicate more openly with government officials
to clear up administrative difficulties without being disproportionately sanctioned for
mistakes. Simultaneously, the government can continue to send a message that
intentional fraud within the health care system will not be tolerated.

